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Good afternoon. Let me begin by thanking the Committee for this opportunity to appear 
before you today.  
 
This Committee’s work concerns one of the foundational aspects of the Affordable Care 
Act. My remarks focus on the legislative framework of the essential health benefits 
statute, because of the extent to which this framework must guide the Committee’s 
deliberations.  This Statement reflects my research into the legislative, administrative, 
and judicial aspects of the regulation of the content of health insurance in both the public 
and private markets.  
 
The essential health benefits statute is unique. Because its legislative history is quite 
limited, the text itself takes on particular importance. The provisions of the statute differ 
significantly from the highly detailed coverage terms of Medicare Parts A and B. 
Similarly, its provisions differ from the coverage provisions of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, which governs virtually all private employer-sponsored health 
benefit plans and which (with the important exception of the insured small group 
market)2 remains unaffected by the essential health benefits provision. In referencing 
broad benefit categories, the essential health benefits statute bears some resemblance to 
the structure of the Medicaid benchmark coverage statute3 and the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP).4 At the same time, however, the statute is substantially more 
robust and in certain respects carries echoes of Medicaid’s heretofore unique non-
discrimination rule.  
 
I begin with an overview of the legal structure of health insurance coverage and then turn 
to the provisions of the statute, concluding with recommendations for the Committee’s 
deliberations. 
 
                                                 
1 Support for this statement comes from the Commonwealth Fund, and the analysis presented here is based 
in part on a forthcoming policy brief prepared for the Fund. 
2 PHSA §2707, added by PPACA §1201 
3 42 USC §1396u-7 
4 42 U.S.C. §1397cc(a) 
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The Legal Structure of Health Insurance Coverage  
 
Health insurance coverage entails legal and financial risk. For this reason the health 
benefit services companies that sell licensed insurance and third party administered 
products logically seek to structure their products to provide as much risk exposure 
protection against the covered population. These risk avoidance techniques go well 
beyond simply strategies for assuring that insurance pays only for medically necessary 
care and allow insurers to exclude and deny health care and treatment that are justified by 
the clinical and scientific evidence but considered to fall outside the scope of coverage.5  
 
A review of the extensive case law generated by health benefit and coverage disputes 
over the decades -- and that through the discovery process offers incomparable insight 
into the coverage practices of both public and private insurers – underscores the various  
structural and drafting strategies used by insurers to limit coverage risk: 
 
Definitions and terms related to specific benefit categories or specific treatment items 
and services within categories: By defining a coverage term narrowly, an insurer or plan 
administrator can shield itself from risk. For example, defining speech therapy as therapy 
needed to restore previous speech function, an insurer can prevent its exposure to the 
costs associated with developmentally disabled children who demonstrate a clinical need 
for speech therapy to attain speech. An insurer also can eliminate its exposure to an 
individual with muscular dystrophy who needs therapy from a clinical perspective to 
maintain a level of speaking function or avert the loss of speech.  
 
Definitions of “medical necessity” and “experimental.” In defining broad terms such as 
medical necessity, insurers and plan administrators similarly can place limits on 
coverage. Perhaps the two most important definitions in this regard are “medical 
necessity” and “experimental,” both of which can be used to narrow the scope of 
otherwise available coverage. A medical necessity definition that ties coverage to 
restoration or recovery would have such a limiting impact on coverage, because its 
impact would be to place certain types of treatments (i.e., treatments to aid in 
development or avert loss of function or maintain function) beyond the scope of 
coverage, regardless of the facts of the case. Similarly, a definition of experimental that 
excludes any treatment not proven effective through scientifically structured clinical trials 
would in turn result in the exclusion of most accepted forms of medical treatment from 
the terms of the plan. 
 
Coverage exclusions. Plan documents may contain coverage exclusions whose impact is 
to place otherwise covered benefits outside the scope of a plan, even when the 
documented clinical and scientific evidence for coverage may be evident. These 
exclusions can be based on the patient’s condition or characteristics or linked to the 
treatment setting (e.g., otherwise-covered speech therapy when furnished in a school 
                                                 
5 One of the clearest examples of such an exclusion is the “intoxication” exclusion, by which on “moral” 
grounds, insurers and health plans routinely exclude coverage for the type of clinically effective treatments 
identified by Elizabeth McGlynn and colleagues in “The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the 
United States,” New Eng. Jour. Medicine  348:2635-2645 (June 26, 2003) Table 5. 
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setting). For example, clinically appropriate physical therapy for a child with 
developmental disabilities might be excluded on the basis that it is “behavioral” or 
“educational,” either because one purpose of the intervention is to aid in proper 
development or because the need for therapy is identified in an individualized educational 
plan. (Not surprisingly, perhaps, many coverage denial cases involve children with 
physical, mental, behavioral, and developmental disabilities).  
 
Embedding treatment guidelines into plan documents. Treatment guidelines can be used 
as informal aids that guide coverage determinations. Insurers and plan administrators also 
can embed treatment guidelines into plan documents, in which case the limits operate as 
fixed coverage limits that automatically narrow the scope of coverage to whatever might 
be contained in the guideline, regardless of whether a patient’s particular condition or 
clinical and other evidence might suggest a different or more intensive approach.6  
 
Numerical limits on certain treatments. A plan can contain fixed limits on services such 
as 10 outpatient therapy sessions or 30 days of hospitalization per spell of illness or 
exclusion of certain types of treatments such as complications in connection with an 
underlying condition whose treatment is excluded.7 Such limitations on coverage would, 
in the absence of other language, apply across the board regardless of patient condition. 
 
Reserving discretion to interpret and apply plan terms and limiting the opportunity to 
challenge denials resulting from individual utilization review.  In the absence of federal 
or state law to the contrary, a plan administrator or insurer can reserve to itself the 
discretion to define the terms of its plan.8 This reservation in turn creates a deferential 
standard in the courts (unless a conflict of interest is found to exist).9 (The Affordable 
Care Act establishes independent external review as a right of all ERISA health plan 
participants and beneficiaries,10 although how this right ultimately affects the ERISA 
deference standard is yet to be decided by the courts.) 
 
The Provisions of the Affordable Care Act and the Essential Health Benefits Statute  
 
Elsewhere, the Affordable Care Act addresses issues of transparency and access to 
independent reviews. These provisions ultimately have the potential to temper the level 
                                                 
6 See, e.g,  Jones v The Kodak Medical Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287 (10th Cir. 1999); Mondry v 
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. 557 F. 3d 781 (7th Cir., 2009). 
7 See, e.g., Kenseth v Dean Health Plan, 610 F. 3d 452 (7th Cir., 2010) 
8 The authority to reserve discretion to interpret plan documents in the case of ERISA-governed plans was 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Firestone Tire and Rubber v Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  
In the context of insured health plans, several states have enacted laws barring the use of discretionary 
clauses, which have been upheld under ERISA as “saved” on the ground that they are laws that regulate 
insurance. Standard Ins. Co. v Morrison, 584 F. 3d 837 (9th Cir., 2009), cert. den. sub nom, Standard Ins. 
Co. v Lindeen, 130 S. Ct. 3275 (2010) 
9 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008) 
 
10 PHSA §2719, added by PPACA §1001 and applied to ERISA through PPACA §1563 
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of deference accorded insurers and plan administrators in cases in which plan documents 
related to coverage must be interpreted and applied.  
 
 The essential health benefits statute itself principally focuses on the actual content of 
coverage. Under the terms of the Act, the provisions apply to the individual and small 
group markets both inside and outside state health insurance Exchanges.11 As a result, the 
statute has the potential to transform coverage in these markets on a national scale.  
Furthermore, because a relatively handful of companies are so influential in the design of 
insurance and health plan products, coverage changes flowing from the essential benefit 
statute eventually may reverberate through the larger group markets as well, whether 
insured or self-insured.  
 
The following provisions of the statute set forth the core parameters of the Secretary’s 
decision-making powers where essential health benefits are concerned:  
 
First, the statute sets forth the HHS Secretary’s definitional duties. Specifically the 
statute directs the Secretary to “define the essential health benefits except that such 
benefits shall include at least the following general categories and the items and services 
covered within the categories: A. ambulatory patient services; B. emergency services; C. 
hospitalization; D. maternity and newborn care; E. mental health and substance use 
disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; F. prescription drugs; G. 
rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; H. laboratory services; I. preventive 
and wellness services and chronic disease management; and J. pediatric services, 
including oral and vision care [italics added].12 The statute thus not only enumerates 10 
general categories of covered services and benefits but also specifies that the categories 
include the items and services covered within the categories.  
 
Second, the statute imposes certain requirements related to the Secretary’s interpretation 
of coverage. Specifically, the statute provides that the “Secretary shall ensure that the 
scope of the essential health benefits . . . is equal to the scope of benefits provided under 
a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary” [italics added].13 The concept of 
benefit scope would commonly be understood as relating to the items and services falling 
within each general category. Under the statute, the question of scope is an empirical one 
that is to be informed by an employer plan survey to be conducted by the Department of 
Labor. The question of scope, furthermore, is not merely legal but under the terms of the 
statute is also actuarial, since equality in coverage must be actuarially certified.14  
 
Complicating the question of equal scope is the fact that common exclusions used by 
insurers and plan administrators mean certain general categories of services (e.g., 
behavioral services, habilitative services) are seldom found in an employer plan; if 
                                                 
11 PHSA §2707, added by PPACA §1201.  A small group that self insures would not be subject to the 
essential health benefit requirements, since  self insured plans are not governed on matters of benefit 
content by laws that regulate insurance. 
12 PPACA §1302(a) and (b) 
13 PPACA §1302(b)(2)(A) 
14 PPAA §1302(b)(2)(B) 
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present at all, they may contain limits far below the standard of treatment. Indeed, were 
the scope of behavioral or habilitation services to be equal to that found in the typical 
employer plan, the essential health benefit package conceivably might contain zero 
coverage for certain general benefit categories.  
 
Third, the statute sets forth certain “required elements for consideration.” The core 
elements are as follows: In “defining” essential health benefits, the Secretary “shall” (A) 
“ensure” that the essential health benefits “reflect an appropriate balance among the 
categories. . . so that benefits are not unduly weighted toward any category;” (B) not 
make “coverage decisions, determine reimbursement rates, establish incentive programs, 
or design benefits in ways that discriminate against individuals because of their age, 
disability, or expected length of life;” (C) “take into account the health care needs of 
diverse segments of the populations, including women, children, persons with disabilities, 
and other groups;” and (D) “ensure that health benefits established as essential not be 
subject to denial to individuals against their wishes on the basis of the individuals’ age or 
expected length of life or of the individuals’ present or predicted disability, degree of 
medical dependency, or quality of life”.15 [italics added] 
 
Key Considerations That Can Guide the Committee’s Deliberations 
 
1. Who decides the scope of coverage?  
 
Under the terms of the statute, it is the HHS Secretary who, aided by a survey conducted 
by the Department of Labor, decides the scope of coverage including the coverage 
categories, the items and services that fall within coverage categories, and therefore, the 
definitional terms that apply to categories, items, and services. These decisions are 
expressly left to the discretion of the Secretary, not insurers or plan administrators, 
although the Secretary conceivably could instruct insurers and plan administrators to 
utilize the terms and definitions in their most popular group health products as long as 
such terms and definitions are not discriminatory within the meaning of the statute. 
 
2. How to define coverage categories, as well as items and services within coverage 
categories, that are not contained in plan documents? 
 
As noted, through total exclusion or the use of exclusionary definitional terms, plan 
documents may exclude entire classes of coverage categories or items and services within 
coverage categories. In such circumstances the duty clearly lies with the Secretary to 
develop the definitions that convey scope, since to limit her interpretation only to items 
and services found in plan documents risks reading entire coverage categories out of the 
statute. Terms such as “behavioral” services and “habilitative” services therefore may 
necessitate a review of the literature as well as consultation with experts in the field in 
order to ensure that effective treatments are properly brought within the terms of 
coverage.  
 
3. What is an “appropriate balance” among coverage categories? 
                                                 
15 PPACA §1302(b)(4)(A)-(D) 
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In the context of the statute, the concept of “appropriate balance” appears to relate to the 
actuarial value of the benefit categories in relation to the total premium so that to at least 
some degree, all items and services are represented. Furthermore, this determination is to 
be made by the Secretary in consultation with the CMS chief actuary and does not appear 
to signal an actuarial equivalency test that can be independently applied by insurers and 
plan administrators. Indeed, in cases in which Congress has permitted an actuarial 
equivalency test, it has been explicit in permitting such an approach.16 
 
4. What does it mean to not discriminate against individuals because of their age, 
disability, or expected length of life and how far does the non-discrimination prohibition 
extend?  
 
With the exception of discrimination based on sex, civil rights laws addressing 
discrimination against individuals based on status (being an individual with a disability, 
on the basis of race or national origin, or on the basis of age) have not been understood as 
reaching the content of health insurance.17 The clearest precedent for the prohibition 
found in the essential benefit statute can be found in the Medicaid statute, whose 
“reasonableness” provision18 has, since the law’s original enactment,19 been understood 
by both the agency20 and the courts21 as barring arbitrary limits in required services based 
solely an individual’s condition, diagnosis, or type of illness. Furthermore, at least two 
recent court decisions suggest that at least some courts also will reject coverage denials 
under Medicare where the basis of the denial is the arbitrary exclusion of otherwise 
covered services based on absence of “recovery” potential.22  
 
Of particular importance to the Committee would be the following considerations: 
 
 The circumstances in which age reasonably can be a coverage factor that rests 
on clinical and scientific evidence. The statute bars discrimination, not the use of 
patient characteristics when such characteristics rest on a reasonable clinical and 
scientific evidentiary base. A decision cannot be made “on the basis of age,” but 
a decision based on clinical factors of which age is a recognized factor (such as 
                                                 
16 See, e.g., Children’s Health Insurance Program and the Medicaid benchmark coverage statute, supra. 
17 See, e.g., See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 1106 (2000) (The public accommodations provisions of the ADA do not reach the content of private 
health insurance); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985) (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does 
not reach the content of public health insurance); see also Sara Rosenbaum, Insurance Discrimination 
Based on Health Status (Georgetown University, O’ Neill Institute) 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/national-health-law/legal-solutions-in-health-
reform/Discrimination.html (Accessed January 5, 2011); Mary Crossley, “Discrimination Against the 
Unhealthy in Health Insurance,” Kansas Law Review, 54 (2005): 73-153, at 85-87.   
18 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(17) 
19 The precursor to the federal non-discrimination rule can be found in the Handbook of Public  
Administration, Supplement D, issued in 1966 by HEW. 
20 42 C.F.R. §440.230(c0 
21 See, e.g., Pinnecke v Preiser 623 F. 2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980)  
22 See, e.g., Papciak v Sibelius  ___ F. Supp. 2d ____, 2010 WL 3885605 (W.D.Pa.)); Anderson v Sibelius, 
___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2010 WL 4273238 (D.Vt.))      ;  
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when best to immunize a child against certain diseases), would not be a decision 
whose basis is age. 
 
 The types of situations in which coverage decisions would impermissibly 
discriminate on the basis of disability. Presumably the Committee will be guided 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act in defining the concept of disability, since 
the ADA addresses the issue of employee health benefits and individual 
insurance coverage outside of the content of coverage context.23 As noted, a 
common discrimination scenario that arises under private health insurance is one 
in which a “restore” or “recover” test is part of the item specific or broad terms of 
coverage or practice guidelines embedded into plan documents that define the 
scope of coverage and what is excluded from coverage. Tests that require 
recovery or restoration inherently discriminate against individuals for whom the 
appropriate clinical basis of an intervention is its impact on the attainment or 
maintenance of function or the aversion of functional loss. When these conditions 
are present, the fact that a covered treatment also may be reflected in an 
employment plan, an individualized education plan, or some other document 
addressing the work-related, social, developmental, or educational needs of a 
patient should not be a permissible basis of exclusion. 
 
 The circumstances under which an individual’s expected length of life is 
appropriate.  In the case of hospice treatment, for example, length of life would 
appear to be a proper consideration. On the other hand, the statute withdraws 
expected length of life as a criterion where reasonable clinical and other relevant 
evidence shows an individual’s ability to benefit from a treatment, with the 
concept of “to benefit” defined to encompass attainment and maintenance of 
health as well as avoidance of deterioration). 
 
In sum, what the statute bars is discrimination in coverage design and plan 
administration. Limits are not prohibited; what are prohibited are limits that discriminate.  
Thus, hospitalization of 30 days per spell of illness or 60 physical therapy treatments may 
limit medically necessary care, but they do so without regard to the underlying condition.  
To be sure, such limits fall with particular severity on the sickest members of the 
coverage groups and are undesirable for many reasons (the most desirable result is of 
course to have enough scientific and clinical evidence to be able to make coverage design 
and administration decisions solely on the basis of the evidence). But courts have ruled 
that across-the-board limits on scope are not discriminatory against persons with 
disabilities under federal civil rights laws, nor, presumably, would across-the-board limits 
“discriminate” against individuals because of age or expected length of life. What makes 
the conduct of insurers “discriminatory” is the use of coverage terms, limits and 
exclusions that fall solely on protected groups that cannot meet the qualification 
standards for whatever coverage is available.  
 
It is also important to note that the scope of the statute’s non-discrimination provision 
sweeps broadly, reaching questions of both coverage design and plan administration 
                                                 
23 ADA Titles I and III and §505 (related to the insurance “safe harbor”) 
Statement of Sara Rosenbaum  8 
January 13, 2011 
activities related to the implementation of coverage, including “coverage decisions,” 
“reimbursement rates” and “incentive programs.” In this context there thus are two types 
of coverage decisions: decisions related to plan design (what benefits, items and services 
will be covered for any member) and the application of plan design to individual patients 
(that is, whether a particular covered item or service be allowed for a particular patient 
given her clinical condition and other relevant and reliable evidence). Coverage decisions 
related to plan design, as well as permissible approaches to reimbursement rates and 
incentive programs, plainly are within the province of the Secretary under the law. 
Individual coverage decisions would most likely be made by a plan administrator during 
the course of utilization review and claims appeal provisions of the Affordable Care Act.  
 
In the context of the non-discrimination provision, an important precedent to consider is 
regulations implementing the 2008 mental health parity amendments. These amendments 
have been interpreted by the Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and 
Treasury as addressing issues of both coverage design and plan administration as well as 
discrimination in both quantitative (i.e., day limits, treatment frequency limits) and non-
quantitative matters (discriminatory terms and definitions, discriminatory medical 
necessity standards, discriminatory use of embedded treatment guidelines).24 
 
 5. How might the health needs of diverse population segments be taken into account? 
 
The question of coverage that takes the needs of diverse populations into account is one 
that appears to address the decision-making process rather than a particular result. Thus, 
through the rulemaking process, including requests for information and comments, as 
well as by referencing evidence-based treatment guidelines where available (such as 
guidelines for the treatment of conditions affecting women, children, persons with 
disabilities, and other groups), the Secretary would appear to fulfill the requirements of 
the statute. 
 
6.  How might the Committee approach the bar against coverage denials against an 
individual’s wishes on the basis of age, expected length of life, or present or predicted 
disability, degree of medical dependency, or quality of life?  
 
As with the question of discrimination, the bar against denials on the basis of age, 
expected length of life, or present or predicted disability, degree of medical dependency, 
or quality of life can be read as barring the use of any of the prohibited factors as the sole 
basis for denial, or the use of coverage terms that exclude otherwise covered treatments a 
priori on prohibited grounds. Thus, coverage terms that exclude treatments because they 
are not restorative would constitute a denial based on present or predicted disability, 
medical dependency or quality of life. By contrast, however, unwise in relation to access 
to necessary medical care, an across-the-board limit on treatment for all persons, while 
disproportionately affecting persons with serious illnesses, medical dependency, or 
disability, would not be a limitation that turns on a prohibited factor. Similarly, an 
individual coverage decision that denies an otherwise medically necessary and 
                                                 
24  See 75 Fed. Reg. 5410-5451 (Feb. 2, 2010). See 45 C.F.R. §146.136(a) defining the scope of parity in 
relation to both qualitative and quantitative treatment limits.  
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appropriate treatment on the basis of the individual’s status as a person with a disability 
or medical dependency, obviously would be prohibited.  
 
In sum, the key concept that runs throughout the statute is “on the basis of.” In health 
insurance, questions of coverage, whether arising as part of a plan design that applies to 
all members, or as a result of the application of design to a particular case, would 
optimally always be grounded in clinical and scientific evidence regarding 
appropriateness of treatment.  The use of arbitrary limits unrelated to the need for care is 
always unwise because of the impact of such limits on persons who need care.  At the 
same time, certain arbitrary limits are inherently discriminatory because they fall 
exclusively on persons with disabilities or serious illness, the prime example being the 
use of a recovery test.  Viewed in this light, the Committee might consider a 
recommendation that permissible coverage limitations and exclusions be restricted to 
those that apply across the board rather than falling exclusively on sub-populations with 
health conditions that either prohibit “recovery” or that, because they are present at birth, 
make recovery irrelevant. 
 
